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Abstract
Rapid technological advancements of vehicle manufacturing and the modern wireless technology
opens the door for several new Intelligent Transportation applications. Remote Keyless system in
vehicles is considered one of the famous applications that has been developed recently, which is
susceptible to many cyberattacks. Remote Keyless applications on smartphones were developed
in the past few years to perform the functionality of keyless fob and are expected to replace the
physical keyless fobs in the next few years, which can open the door to many cyberattacks. In
this research, we implemented a simulation that represents the REmote Car KeyLESS Applications
(RECKLESS-apps) on the smartphones. In this thesis we demonstrate the types of cyberattacks
these applications could face. Our research serves as a proof that remote car keyless applications
that would replace the physical keys could be vulnerable to various malicious cyberattacks. We





Rapid technological advancements of vehicle manufacturing and the modern wireless technology
opens the door for several new Intelligent Transportation applications. Remote Keyless system in
vehicles is considered one of the famous applications that has been developed recently, which is
susceptible to many cyberattacks. Remote Keyless applications on smartphones were developed
in the past few years to perform the functionality of keyless fob and are expected to replace the
physical keyless fobs in the next few years, which can open the door to many cyberattacks. In
this research, we implemented a simulation that represents the REmote Car KeyLESS Applications
(RECKLESS-apps) on the smartphones. In this thesis we demonstrate the types of cyberattacks
these applications could face. Our research serves as a proof that remote car keyless applications
that would replace the physical keys could be vulnerable to various malicious cyberattacks. We
study these attacks and provide remedies and cyber-hygiene and best practices to remedy some of
these attacks.
In the last few years, Remote Car Keyless applications were released on the smartphones which
perform the functionality of the physical key fob. Moreover, companies (e.g., BMW) are expecting to
entirely replace the key fobs with smartphones applications [1]. The idea is not very popular at the
time and is under construction. These applications open the door to many malicious cyberattacks.
In this research, we developed a Remote Car Keyless application on a smartphone, by developing
an iOS application. We simulated cyberattacks, such as Evil Twin Attack and Man in the Middle
Attack, and discussed how these attacks could be mitigated.
In Chapter 2, we provide general background information and related work, to support different
components of our thesis as well as highlighting the overall history of security in Intelligent Trans-
portation Systems (ITS). We discuss the history of the remote keys used for vehicles. In Chapter
3, we show the analysis and design of the Remote Car keyless Applications on smartphones. We
highlight several existing applications in the app store and describe the architecture diagram. Also,
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we emphasis the simulation design of the iOS application we developed for our system and the
backend server. In Chapter 4, we show the actual implementation of the iOS mobile application,
using Objective-C, and the sequence diagram of how to use the app and its communication with
the backend server. In Chapter 5, we study the security attacks that can occur on vehicles and
the mobile application, such as Traffic Analysis attack, Social Engineering attack, Denial of Service
attack, etc. Then, we show types of attacks performed on our system (Evil Twin Attack and Man in
the Middle attack). Finally, we analyze some of these cyberattack vectors and provides mitigation
techniques. In Chapter 6, we discuss the conclusion of our work and show the future work that can
be applied to our system.
1.1 Motivations
The car thefts that have happened and recorded recently is the main motivation for our work.
Thieves were able to steal a Mercedes Bens car without using a key in just seconds, in one of
the first relay crimes caught on camera [2]. All this made us think about the current smartphone
applications on the app store and how these applications are vulnerable to various malicious attacks.
These applications currently have less than average customer reviews, which might be an indi-
cation of how unsecured these applications currently are. It is time for researchers to focus on this
hot topic by studying the vulnerability of these applications to various cyber-attacks.
1.2 Objectives and Goals
There are four main objectives/goals behind our research
• Explore current research done on the topic of Smart Keys for vehicles,
• Show how Remote Car Keyless applications work by implementing a simulated app,
• Perform cyberattacks on the Remote Car Keyless applications,
• Discuss what kind of mitigation techniques can be applied to improve the security of these
apps.
1.3 Contributions
In this thesis we study using smartphones as smart car keys, to access/control vehicles remotely from
any place using different types of communication. We implemented a simulation of how Remote Car
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Keyless applications work. Also, we study the communication that happens between the smartphone
application and the backend server, which acts as the victims car. We perform two cyberattacks
(Evil Twin Attack and Man in the Middle attack), and then we discuss what kind of mitigation
should be applied to improve vulnerable to Evil Twin and Man in the Middle attacks.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
In this chapter, we provide general background information and related work to support different
components of our thesis as well as highlight the overall history of security in Intelligent Transporta-
tion Systems (ITS) research. We highlight various ITS applications and provide examples of related
transportation systems. We discuss the history of car key used for vehicles. In addition, we highlight
the effect of wireless communication on the remote keyless entry in vehicles.
2.1 Intelligent Transportation Systems: Connected and Autonomous Ve-
hicles
An Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) is a system that improves traffic safety, by notifying the
driver about the current situation to take the proper action [3]. In Intelligent Transportation Sys-
tems, vehicles can communicate with different types of objects (e.g., communication with other vehi-
cles (Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V)), communicate with roadside units (RSU) (Vehicles-to-Infrastructure
(V2I)). Figure 2.1 shows different types of communication that can occur in the ITS.
Figure 2.1: V2X communication [4]
2.2 Types of Communications in Intelligent Transportation Systems
In this section, We introduce in more details different types of ITS communications. These types
of communications usually adopt standard Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) for
5
fast communications which are shortrange wireless communication channels specially designed for
automotive use and a corresponding set of protocols and standards (IEEE 802.11p [5, 6]). The
transmission range of DSRC is 300 meters (new DSRC assume 1000 meters). DSRC for intelligent
transportation systems operates in the 5.9 GHz and (U.S.) or 5.8 GHz band (Japan, Europe). In all
these types of communications, safe communication channels are needed for the wireless transmission.
2.2.1 Vehicle-to-Vehicle - V2V
Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication is the wireless transfer of data between vehicles. Informa-
tion such as speed, location, direction, acceleration and deceleration are different types of data that
can be send/receive between different vehicles.
2.2.2 Vehicle-to-Infrastructure - V2I
Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communication is the wireless transfer of data between vehicles and
infrastructure of the road. The wireless communication occurs between the on-board unit (OBU)
and the road side units (RSU). Several applications are using these types of communication such as
Traffic Control for emergency vehicles, and Traffic Sign Recognition (TSR) [7]. Figure 2.2 shows an
example of V2I and V2V communication.
Figure 2.2: Combined V2I and V2V communication [8].
2.2.3 Vehicle-to-Pedestrian - V2P
Vehicle-to-Pedestrian (V2P) communication is the wireless transfer of data between vehicles and
pedestrians, it takes advantage of hardware included in smartphones of pedestrians, such as Global
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Positioning System(GPS) sensor and accelerometers, to make people on the street ”visible” to the
vehicles [9]. Several researchers have been studying these types of applications [10].
2.3 Features of Applications in Intelligent Transportation
In general, Intelligent Transportation applications have four different fundamental demands: scala-
bility, availability, context-awareness, and security and privacy [11, 12].
1. Scalability: Because of the number of vehicles that could be incorporated into Vehicular Net-
works, Vehicular Networks may become the largest ad hoc network in the history. Undoubtedly,
scalability will be a critical factor. The use of hybrid architecture, together with in-network
aggregation techniques and Peer-to-Peer (P2P) technologies, make information exchange more
scalable.
2. Availability: Due to the real-time interaction between vehicular networks and the physical
world, availability is an important factor in system design. This may have a major impact on
the safety and efficiency of future highway systems. The architecture should be robust enough
to withstand unexpected system failures or deliberate attacks.
3. Context-Awareness: As a cyber-physical system, applications in intelligent transportation col-
lect information from the physical world and may conversely impact the physical world.
4. Security and Privacy: There is a recent trend of making vehicular on-board computer systems
inter-connectable to other systems. The Ford Sync, for example, connects the vehicles enter-
tainment system to the drivers cell phone via blue-tooth technology. In the future, vehicular
on-board computers could even be open to software developers. These trends may have serious
implications for security and privacy due to the cyber-physical nature of these applications.
Governments and consumers will have very high expectations of safety and security.
2.4 A key/keyless System for Vehicles
The key for the vehicle has been modified for years to help drivers to unlock/lock the vehicle, adding
different functionalities. The keyless entry system was introduced in 1980 by Ford, Mercury and
Lincoln. Later, several other companies introduced keyless remote key in their vehicles. The early
stage of the Keyless remotes contain a short-range radio transmitter, and must be within a certain
range of 520 meters, of the car to operate [13]. The idea is very simple, when a driver pushes the
button in the remote, it sends a coded signal by radio waves to a receiver unit in the car, which locks
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or unlocks the door. Most remote keyless entry (RKE)s operate at a frequency of 315 MHz for North
America-made cars and at 433.92 MHz for European, Japanese and Asian cars [13]. After a number
of incidents in the mid-1990′s, vehicle manufactories implemented encryption as well as rotating
entry codes to prevent car thieves from intercepting and spoofing the signal. In early 2000, the idea
of remote keyless ignition system was introduced that can in addition of locking and unlocking the
door, can start the engine. Figure 2.3 shows different types of keyless systems.
Figure 2.3: Keyless System for vehicles[14][15][16][17]
Nowadays, most of the new vehicles are using a smart key. Vehicle Manufactories are looking for
new ways to use smartphone capabilities. The fact that almost everyone carries a smartphone and
there are mobile app which allows car owners to perform tasks on their cars, make fashioned keys
less relevant [1]. Security and privacy of the users of these apps are very critical. Several researchers
have pointed to the importance of studying the privacy and security of these new systems but until
now, as far as we researched, no one did a complete study of the possible attacks on these new
systems.
2.4.1 Smartphones Applications
There are a large number of applications for smartphones that have a deep impact in ITS, appli-
cations that improve and help the transportation systems. Smartphone applications in Intelligent
Transportation include data collection and management [18], tracking vehicle and anti-theft Sys-
tem [19], applications that help drivers reduce the fuel consumption of their vehicles by evaluating
driving efficient patterns[20], applications for smart parking [21, 22] and applications for keyless
smart systems [23]. In addition, Driving Style Recognition is one of the applications that used to
help in vehicle safety systems, they detect, recognize and record aggressive actions without external
processing in order to increase awareness and promote driver safety using Dynamic Time Warping
and smartphone based sensor-fusion (accelerometer, GPS, video ...etc)[24].
Traffic Accident Detection and Notifications with smartphones is another example where it uses
an approach to reduce delay between accident occurrence and first responder dispatch, automatically
detects traffic accidents using accelerometers and acoustic data and immediately notifies a central
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emergency dispatch server after an accident[25]. Figure 2.4 shows an example of a Smartphone-based
accident detection system.
Figure 2.4: Smartphone-based accident detection system[25].
A Driver profiling systems is another application of using smartphones and mobile devices to
identify risky driving maneuvers and to improve driver efficiency. It can be useful in fleet manage-
ment, insurance premium adjustment, fuel consumption optimization or CO2 emission reduction[26].
Several car manufactures started to have apps that can control the vehicles, performs functions such
as: Lock/unlock, start the vehicle, open the windows, flash lights, honk horn, and Open windows
and roof. Figure 2.5 shows different examples of smart phone applications on app store and google
play for starting and controlling some functionalities of the vehicle.
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Figure 2.5: Smartphone App Keyless systems[27][28][29].
Despite the fact that developers and Intelligent Transportation experts are eager to integrate
smartphones with Intelligent Transportation System applications, the security of these systems must
be checked to prevent fatal consequences. Cyber attacks on these system are important to identify
to protect drivers, vehicles and the privacy of all involved.
2.4.2 Cyber Attacks on Keyless Remote Entry/Ignition Systems
It is important to discuss the cyber-security implications of ITS and the potential cyber-attacks
specific to these types of applications. We will summarize the threats on ITS and cooperative auto-
mated vehicles. Communication uses cellular network to connect with the smart phone, Bluetooth
is used to connect to the vehicle for application such as audio, video applications in the vehicle.
Figure 2.6 shows the communication between the vehicle and driver’s smartphone or computer.
Figure 2.6: How these applications communicate with the vehicles[30]
The Remote Keyless Ignition (RKI) does not provide much security by default. In October 2014,
some insurers in the United Kingdom (UK) would not insure certain vehicles with keyless ignition
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without buying security devices [31]. Several cases were reported where criminals were able to open
cars by tricking vehicles to think that their keyless entry fobs were close enough, although they were
far away [32]. In 2015, it was reported that an inexpensive electronic device about the size of a
wallet was built that could be placed near a locked vehicle to capture the keyless entry code that is
used to unlock the vehicle. In 2017, a group of researchers pulled off the relay hack with a pair of
gadgets they built for just $22 .
Smartphone applications for Remote Keyless started in 2011 by Jeep and other manufacturers.
There are growing number of smartphone application users who wishes to use their smartphone to
control their vehicles. Security has not yet been studied sufficiently to ensure that these applications
are not vulnerable to security attacks. Attacks such as: Denial of service attack, sniffing attack,
man in the middle attack (MiTM), or other attacks must be studied.
In this thesis, we study various attacks on smartphone applications. We designed and developed
a smartphone application for the keyless ignition, using iOS for testing. We analyzed various attacks
that can be performed on these types of smartphone applications. Our results show that a more
powerful security must be added to these types of systems.
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Chapter 3
Analysis and Design of RECKLESS-APPs
In this chapter, we show the analysis and design of the Remote Car keyless Applications for smart-
phones. We highlight several existing applications in the market and we describe their architecture
diagram. Also, we present the simulation design of the iOS application used for our system. Finally,
we discuss the design of the backend server.
3.1 Analysis of RECKLESS-APPS in the Market
Nowadays, every car manufacture has it’s own application on the smartphone stores, but a very
limited number of them have Keyless Remote App embedded in the application that allows the
functionality of the physical keyless system. In order to design our simulation app we will show and
discuss few of the applications that currently exist to see their basic functionality. Despite the fact
that smartphone applications exists on both the apple(iOS) and google play stores(Android), we
focus on the applications on the appstore. In the following sections, we show the functionality of
two different applications from two different car manufactures: Jeep and BMW.
3.1.1 Jeep-Uconnect
In the Jeep manufactory, in order to be able to use the smartphone application, you need to register
your Uconnect System and your Jeep vehicle must be properly equipped with compatible Uconnect
system. Uconnect features started in 2013. The Jeep Uconnect Application is simple in User
Interface (UI) design. figure 3.1 shows the functionality of the Uconnect app.
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Figure 3.1: Jeep-UConnect[29]
In Uconnect application, users can perform the following functions [29]:
• Lock or unlock your car from virtually anywhere.
• Start your car and cancel start remotely.
• Flash the lights and sound the horn to help find your car.
• Locate your car on a map using Vehicle Finder.
3.1.2 BMW Connected
”BMW Connnected” is another example of a smartphone iOS application that requires an active
BMW ConnectedDrive subscriptions. The vehicle must also be properly equipped with compatible
BMW ConnectedDrive system (cellular network) in order to use this application. The app is opti-
mized for vehicles from 2014 and newer. Elegance and excessive functions are very obvious in this




In BMW Connected smartphone app, users can perform the following functions [28]:
• Lock or unlock your BMW and activate the climate control, anytime and anywhere.
• Send destinations from the app to your in-car navigation system.
• Find your car.
• Schedule trips, get alerted when to leave (based on traffic), and find parking spot nearby.
• Track your driving efficiency and manage battery charge.
• Access Roadside Assistance, schedule service appointments, and connect via Amazon Alexa or
Google Assistant.
Both applications from Jeep and BMW have some common functionalities and some differences.
3.2 Comparison between two of smartphone applications in the appstore
After testing both applications (Jeep-Uconnect, BMW-Connected), we summarize their comparison
in the table below:
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Table 3.1: Comparison between Jeep-Uconnect and BMW-Connected
Remote Car keyless Applications
Characteristic Jeep-Uconnect BMW-Connected
Free-App 3 3
Support Apple-Watch 3 3
Free-to-Register 7 3
Require paid Subscription 3 3
Require Cellular Network 3 3
Good Apple Store Reviews 7 7
As mentioned in the above table, both apps Jeep-Uconnect and BMW-Connected have less than
average application reviews in the app-store. Jeep-Uconnect has a 2 out of 5 while BMW-Connected
has a 2.5 out of 5 in March 2018. The non-satisfactory rating and the fact that these applications
are relatively new were the reasons for us to investigate how these applications work and their
vulnerability to cyber attacks [33].
3.3 Design of RECKLESS-APP simulation
As mentioned in the two previous sections, the Remote Car keyless Applications are considered
relatively new and there are very few cars with subscribed cellular network. We designed an iOS
smartphone application that simulates the Remote car keyless applications currently used in stores.
Also, we replace the vehicle with a computer (server machine) that represents the computer embed-
ded in the vehicle. The overall design of the system consists of mainly two parts, the first part is
the smartphone application built on the iPhone plateform (iOS), the second part is the car manu-
facturer’s service and the car system itself. We decided to use Linux Ubuntu server to act as our
car. In the middle, we depend on the cellular network for connection to simulate the real connection
between the two parts. Figure 3.3 shows that architecture diagram of our testing system.
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Figure 3.3: Architecture Diagram
3.3.1 iPhone iOS Application: Design and Mockups
We kept the application as simple as possible. It includes two main steps, the first one is the
registration of a new account by providing the required information from the user about his/her car,
the user can later use the created credentials to login to the system. figure 3.4 shows the registration
page in the app, that allows new users to register to our system.
Figure 3.4: App-Registration
The second step is the functionality that the app could provide, includes locking/unlocking the
car, start the engine, locating the car, honk horn and provide more info about the car service. Figure
3.5 shows the app-functionality, more details in the chapter 4.
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Figure 3.5: App-Functionality
For the implementation, we used Objective-C for the iOS development and we use Software
Development Kit (SDKs) such as Apple MapKit [34]. Apples Objective-C using Xcode was chosen
to create the iPhone application. Objective-C has the advantage of learning and developing a mobile
app easier than some more advanced languages. Its main functionalities are for creating the user
interface of the app, handling logic within the app, making API calls to get data from the database,
and parsing through the returned data to be displayed via the user interface.
3.3.2 Backend Server acts as the vehicle
In order to complete our system, we used a Linux Ubuntu Host in the lab to act as the vehicle
manufacturer’s service and the vehicle. We created a RESTful Application Programming Interface
(API) using Java that handles the request/response in JavaScript object notation (JSON), formatted




Simulation of RECKLESS-Apps using an iOS Approach
As we mentioned in Chapter 3, we created an iOS application as to be able to simulate how the
Remote KeyLess Applications work. A user ”or a driver” simply uses our simulated RECKLESS-
Application to create a new account providing his/her required information. After registration, each
user can perform multiple functionalities that most of the current Remote Keyless Applications on
the store perform. In order to complete our system, we assumed a server machine that acts as
the vehicle manufacture service and the vehicle system. The iOS RECKLESS-Application com-
municates with the localhost server using RESTful JavaScript object notation (JSON) Application
Programming Interface (API). Moreover, a database is created on the localhost to save/retrieve the
user information. In this chapter, we discuss in details the hardware and software involved in our
system, system architecture, database design and finally the application flow.
4.1 Overview of Hardware and Software
In this section, we discuss the mobile application functionality, the server details, and the database
design.
4.1.1 Mobile Development
The iOS mobile application was developed using Apple's Objective-C language. The Objective-C
language was chosen for a variety of reasons. First and foremost, it’s an object-oriented language.
The kind of functionality that’s packaged in the Cocoa frameworks can only be delivered through
object-oriented techniques. Second, because Objective-C is an extension of the standard ANSI
C, existing C programs can be adapted to use the software frameworks without losing any of the
work that went into their original development. Because Objective-C incorporates C, you get all
the benefits of C when working within Objective-C [35]. The mobile app main functionalities are
creating the user interface of the app, handling logic within the app, making API calls to get data
from the host database, and parsing through the returned data to be displayed via the user interface.
The API calls being made by Objective-C are hosted on the same environment as the database.
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4.1.2 The Vehicle Server
The vehicle server plays the role of a vehicle by responding to different messages coming from our
simulated mobile application. In addition, it provides the wireless communication capabilities that
a vehicle may have such as Bluetooth, WiFi and Cellular Network communication [36].
4.1.3 Database
In order to keep track of the information needed for our simulation such as driver information, vehicle
information, and functionalities, a MySQL database has been created and hosted on the server. The
database contains information such as a ”Users” entity and ”Cars” entity. This database should be
constantly updated to ensure the mobile application is displaying real-time information, when users
check the applications at any given time as a part of the simulation. The MySQL database was cre-
ated on an Ubuntu Server using a PHPMyAdmin GUI. The database, titled ”RECKLESS”, is com-
prised of three entities including, ”users” , ”cars” and ”users cars” storing necessary attributes. The
”users” table will hold the users information (userId, name, hashed password and email). The ”cars”
table will hold the cars information (carId, model, make, year and picture) and the ”users cars”
tables will hold specific user’s car information such as (userId, carId, VIN number, service Info,
car latitude, car longitude, lock status and engine status). The database will be constantly updated
to ensure users are getting accurate information when they check the mobile application at any given
moment.
4.2 Methodology of Communication
4.2.1 System Architecture Overview
Before going into the details of the application, it will first help to step back and take a look at the
simulation as a whole. The overarching goal of the simulation is to provide an application that allows
users to check specific vehicle information and perform some functionalities to simulate the Remote
Keyless Applications. There are two components for this system: the backend component which is
the vehicle server host simulating the vehicle manufacturer’s service and vehicle system. The front
end mobile app itself is simply the iPhone application. As users navigate through the application, the
app pulls responses with information from the database, almost at real time. The application also
may request to update some information such as Lock/Unlock status of the vehicle. The application
communicates with the backend with a cellular network to simulate the communication in the real
Remote Keyless Applications. The backend is simply a Linux server that is running a Tomcat
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application server to handle the request/response to update/retrieve information in JSON formate.
Figure 4.1 shows the system architecture.
Figure 4.1: System Architecture
4.2.2 Application Flow and Data Flow Diagram
The user starts the app and the welcome screen pops up with Signin/Signup options. The user can
sign up for a new account where he/she can specify different attributes for his/her information(name,
username, password, email) and car information (VIN number , car model, car make and year), as
soon as the password on the frontend matches, a POST request will be sent to the backend server
with the mentioned information, the user information (name, username, hashed password, email)
will be stored in the ”users” table with a new (user id), a new record will be stored in the table
”users cars” joining the ”user id” with the selected ”car id”. Initially arbitrary vales will be added
for (car latitude, car longitude, service Info) with initial values for (lock status, engine status). A
response with OK will be returned to the user application to send him/her to the Home screen.
The user will be able to log in, using his/her username and password, next time he/she uses the
application to be authenticated by the backend.
The Home screen will be populated with information such as (car model, make and year) and a
user can now update his/her information in the profile section or the service Information.
The user will be able to send a request to fetch the last updated location of the vehicle(car latitude,
car longitude) and perform other actions such as (Lock/Unlock car, Engine start/stop and Horn
on/off). Figure 4.2 shows the data flow diagram.
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Figure 4.2: Data Flow Diagram
Resources that are required for this simulation include:
• Apple iPhone 7
• Xcode program to develop the app in Apples Objective-C language
• Ubuntu Server, to represent the vehicle
• MySQL Database
• PHPMyAdmin GUI for MySQL server.
• Java Tomcat Application Server.
4.3 Mobile Application
Users start with a welcome screen to login or sign up. After the log-in, the user will be redirected
to the Home screen where he/she can perform various actions, such as (Lock/Unlock car, locate the
car or display the user information). After the user signs out, he/she will be returned back to the
home screen. Figure 4.3 represents the application flow.
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Figure 4.3: Application Flow Diagram
4.3.1 Welcome and Sign-Up Pages
First, the welcome page that has two main functionalities:
• Sign up where the user will be directed to a new page to sign up for a new account.
• Login where the user will be directed to a new page to login to his/her account using the
password.
The Sign up page, gather all the required information from the user such as (name, password,
email, car VIN number, Car Model, Car Make, Year) and send a POST request to the backend to
save the information, then the page waits for the success response to redirect to the Home Page.
Figure 4.4 shows Welcome and Sign-Up pages in the application.
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Figure 4.4: Welcome and Sign-Up pages
4.3.2 Home and User Information Side Pages
The user could slide from the left or push the button at the Home page and see a list of options
• Profile: the user is redirected to a page to view/edit the saved information.
• Service Info: the user is redirected to a page to fetch (GET request) the desired service
information. The user can edit the service information, if necessary.
• Logout: The user is redirected to the welcome screen.
Figure 4.5 shows Home and User Information side pages in the application.
Figure 4.5: Home and User Information Side Pages
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4.3.3 Location and Lock/Unlock Pages
The user can select the location icon, from the Home page bar to retrieve the car location, the
location page is shown and a GET request is sent to the backend server to fetch the most updated
Latitude and Longitude of the car and the map zooms to the vehicle’s location. Also, the user can
perform several functionalities from the app. The user can select the Lock/Unlock icon at the Home
page to perform the required functionality. The Lock/Unlock page is displayed and a POST request
is sent to the backend server to update the database with the selected functionality.
Despite the fact that more functionalities can be added such as open windows, open roof..etc, we
decided to use a simple functionality such as the Lock/Unlock to perform several attacks as shown
later in Chapter 5.
Figure 4.6 shows Location and Lock/Unlock pages in the application.
Figure 4.6: Location and Lock/Unlock pages
4.4 Database
The database is hosted on the host server which represents the vehicle. In a fully developed applica-
tion, the database will be hosted on a Cloud-Storage such as Amazon Web Servers. The database is
using MySQL with PHPMyAdmin. The database information is reflected on the mobile application,
so the users can view/update this information. The following figures contain screenshots of the
database configuration and how it was structured along with an Entity Relationship (ER) diagram.
The user id is the primary key of the table where it is an auto-increment value that is added the
moment a new user registers. The name and email are the user’s personal name and email address.
Finally, the password is hashed in the Users Table to keep the privacy of the users. Figure 4.7 shows
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the users table.
Figure 4.7: Users Table
In the Cars Table, information about the vehicle’s make, model, and year are stored. Also, an
image of the vehicle model is stored in the database. Figure 4.8 shows the cars table.
Figure 4.8: Cars Table
The fact that one user may have more than one vehicle and one vehicle can be owned by more
than one user, made us design the database as a many-to-many relation M-to-M. In the Users-
Cars Table, information such as VIN, service information, last known latitude and longitude, and
lock status are stored. More information can be added later such as engine status and other infor-
mation. Figure 4.9 shows the Users-Cars table.
Figure 4.9: Users-Cars table
Figure 4.10 shows the Entity Relationship diagram where two tables are connected using a M-
to-M relationship.
25
Figure 4.10: Entity Relationship Diagram
In this chapter, we were able to create a mobile application that simulates the real-application
used to replace the remote keyless used these days to perform the needed functionality on a vehicle.
This simulated app is used to perform a series of cyber-attacks as shown in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 5
Security Attacks on RECKLESS-APPs
In Chapter 4, we developed a system that simulates the Remote Keyless Applications. An iOS
mobile application was designed, developed and built to act similar to most of the applications in
the app store. In addition, a Linux Server was built to act as the vehicle services and the vehicle
computer. In this Chapter, we study the security attacks that can occur on vehicles and the mobile
application, such as the Man in the Middle attack, Traffic Analysis attack, Social Engineering attack,
Denial of Service attack, and etc. Then, we showed the types of attacks performed on our system.
Finally, we analyze some of these cyber-attack vectors and provides mitigation techniques, cyber
hygiene best practices, and suggest ways to balance security versus convenience.
5.1 Cyber Attacks on Vehicles and Applications
A number of cyber-attacks could be performed on both sides of the system: the vehicle and/or
the Remote Keyless application. In this section, we discussed briefly classifications of cyber-attacks
[37, 38]. We explain couple of these attacks and how it can be performed. We start with the
Monitoring Attacks, which is the most common type of attacks related to our system. In these types
of attacks, the attacker can track and monitor the system by monitoring the network communication,
occurring between the vehicle and the application.
5.1.1 Man-in-the-Middle(MITM) Attack
Man-in-the-middle attack is a real time unauthorized interception of the private communication
between the victim and his/her vehicle. The man-in-the-middle attack tries to gather as much
possible information as possible from the connection, without the victim’s knowledge [39, 40, 41].
The victim’s information is then used to do another attack or to access the vehicle. Figure 5.1 shows
the Man-in-the-Middle(MITM) attack.
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Figure 5.1: Man in the middle attack
Another example of an attack following the Man-in-the-Middle attack is to follow up with Traffic
Analysis Attack. The attackers collect the information from the vehicle about network nodes iden-
tities or characteristics to determine and identify various kind of traffic information packets. Figure
5.2 shows MITM attack on different layers of the OSI Model and types of cellular networks [42].
Figure 5.2: MITM Attack on Different Layers of OSI Model and Types of Cellular Networks[42]
5.1.2 Social Engineering Attack
Social Engineering attack is the psychological manipulation of people into performing actions or
making decisions that could affect the security or the safety of the victim’s vehicle [43]. Attacker
would send deceiving or even inappropriate messages to make the victim do things that would
compromise the system’s security or make the victim angry to behave irrationally [44]. There are
several examples of attacks that use Social Engineering [45, 46].
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5.1.3 Application-oriented Attack
In this type of attack, the attacker targets the vehicles safety applications which are deployed
in a vehicle. They want to get information on events such as (car accident, traffic jam, post-
crash, obstacle, emergency braking and so on)[47]. A customized version of this attack is the
Broadcast Tampering Attack, where the attackers change the broadcasted safety messages to false
safety messages. This tampering can causes more accidents and create huge traffic jams. A new
type of application attacks is Illusion Attack, in which the attackers deceive the vehicle sensors and
resulting in providing wrong traffic warning messages [47].
5.1.4 Denial of Service Attack
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack target the availability of vehicle’s service system, by flooding the
system with unnecessary traffic packets to reduce the system availability diminish operation accuracy
[37]. Several researchers predict that the next Denial of Service attacks on vehicles are imminent
[48, 49]. Figure 5.3 shows the Denial of Service attack concept.
Figure 5.3: DOS Attack
5.1.5 Other Attacks
There are several other attacks that can occur in the vehicle world. For example, Sybil Attack, the
attacker forges the identity of one or more vehicles. They deceive the other vehicles in the network
to cast any type of attack on the system. In Malware/Spamming Attacks, attacker infects the vehicle
with a worm or virus to send the critical information from the vehicle and to other servers. These
attacks may be done by a fraudulent insider or by the outsiders[37]. A Black Hole Attack, makes a
vehicle to decline to be a part in the network, when all network traffics is diverted to this particular
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vehicle, which causes the information to be dropped or lost[43].
5.2 Attacking RECKLESS-Apps
In the previous section 5.1, we discussed various classes and types of possible cyber-attacks on vehicles
and applications. In this section, we discuss how cyber-attacks are performed on our system. In
order to perform any kind of attack, we looked first at how the real keyless applications work and
decided our cyber-attacks. Figure 5.4 shows the connection between the mobile application and the
vehicle.
Figure 5.4: Connection between the mobile application and the vehicle
A Remote Keyless Mobile application typically connects to the vehicle over cellular network, at
any place and any time to perform different functionalities that the application provides. However, it
is also possible for the user to use WiFi to perform these functions. We apply the Evil Twin Attack,
tricking our victim to use a malicious WiFi network that we created. In the following subsection we
show the details Evil Twin attack.
5.2.1 Applying Evil Twin Attack
Most public places, coffee shops, fast food restaurants, and airports provide free WiFi network ac-
cess to their customers, offering free Internet access. However, most of these types of networks are
insecure, requiring no authentication and encryption. When the user accesses these WiFi networks,
he/she must agree to their terms and conditions, where the Internet Service Provider(ISP) accepts
no responsibility for the security or privacy of the customer information[50]. The Evil Twin At-
tack(ETA) allows the victim to access a fake WiFi network with a stronger signal. An ETA can
be established by an attacker to mock the role of a legitimate WiFi access point and gain informa-
tion/control without the victim’s knowledge. An open WiFi network can only be recognized by its
MAC address and its Service Set Identifier(SSID). This impersonation is relatively simple, since the
attacker’s fake access point (AP) may provide a more powerful signal to the victim, encouraging the
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victim to connect to the attacker’s network instead of the legitimate network [51]. Figure 5.5 shows
the real Starbucks WiFi and how it can be easily mocked.
Figure 5.5: Starbucks Free WiFi
A victim, driver, decided to sit in a public area. The strong WiFi signal may encourage the victim
to connect to the fake WiFi. The driver may use his/her application to warm the car, especially in
winter time. Figure 5.6 shows the overview of this attack that we performed.
Figure 5.6: The victim is using the attacker’s WiFi
After the victim connects to the attacker’s AP, the attacker would spy on the victims wireless
data and collect data that can be used to perform a number of attacks. Below, we listed different
31
kinds of attacks that could be performed, after a successful Evil Twin Attack.
• A Mobile Data Consumption Attack: The first thing an attacker wants is to make
sure that the victim doesn’t switch back to the cellular network to use the Remote Keyless
Application. The victim must keep on using the malicious WiFi, so the attacker can proceed
with other attacks. According to Wasil [51], attacker can force the victims smartphone to
consume data through the cellular network by switching the victim from the WiFi network to
the cellular network while downloading a large file. This will make sure that the victim will
subsequently depend on our malicious WiFi.
Figure 5.7: Mobile Data Consumption Attack
• Man in the Middle Attack: Man in the middle attack is the most relevant attack in
our case, and it is the main target of an attacker after the success of the Evil Twin Attack.
The attacker can use, for example, Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) spoofing/poisoning
to complete a Man in the Middle attack. The ARP protocol is used to find MAC address of
a host associated with an IP address on a subnet. When the hacker uses this technique, it
can intercept the data in transit, compromising both the integrity and confidentiality of the
system.
• Denial of Service Attack: Once the man in the middle attack was performed, and necessary
information was gathered. The attacker will perform a Denial of Service attack on the victim’s
phone, by flooding it with more traffic than it can handle. The smartphone would remain
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connected to the fake WiFi without any useful data service. This may force the victim to leave
the place [52].
Figure 5.8: Denial of Service Attack
• GPS spoofing Attack: Once the man in the middle attack was performed, and necessary
information was gathered. The attacker can perform attacks on the vehicle that was compro-
mised. In a V2V network, vehicles depend on the integrity of data they receive from other
vehicles and road side units to make decisions regarding safety messages and alerts. The at-
tacker can create a GPS-simulator to generate false readings to deceive other vehicles in the
network[53].
5.2.2 Applying Man in the Middle Attack
We performed the Man in the Middle Attack including ARP poisoning. We used two programs to
perform our attack, the first program is called ”Cain & Abel” which runs on Windows Operating
System. It allows sniffing the network traffic and cracking encrypted passwords.
Once you start the sniffer, you get a list of IP addresses, related to the clients on the network.
Using the Victim IP and the Gateway IP (Malicious Router), attacker can start APR by click on
the radioactive button in the toolbar.
The other tool we used is Wireshark. We started by selecting the network interface which in our
case is the malicious WiFi (under name: Starbucks-Free), Wireshark inspects packets coming from
the victim’s IP to make sure that the ARP poisoning is successful. Attacker can filter packets and
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identify the Remote Keyless Application as the host and get the user credentials.
5.2.3 Summary of Attacks
1. The victim joins the attacker's fraudulent WiFi network (Evil Twin Attack).
2. The attacker captures the victim's credentials when using the application (Man in the Middle
Attack).
3. The attacker steals the vehicle using the victim's credentials.
Figure 5.9: Summary of Attacks
5.3 Mitigation solutions and recommendations to protect RECKLESS-
Apps from Cyber attacks
The whole idea of performing these cyber-attacks is to provide mitigation techniques, cyber hy-
giene best practices, and suggest ways to balance security versus convenience. In this section, we
are considering the mitigation solutions and recommendations against these two attacks to our
RECKLESS-App.
5.3.1 Evil Twin Attack Mitigation
In order to protect the system from Evil Twin attack, we present two methods of defense [54].
• Context-leashing is a detection strategy based on recording the nearby access points when
first associating with an access point. Using this context, the victim can determine if an
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adversary did already setup an evil twin access point at a different location. This technique
can be deployed without any modification to the access points, using only the contextual
information, which is the list of all access points that are visible to the client at a familiar
location. Let’s say that a client associates to an access point with an SSID Fav-Coffee. While
associated, the client can see messages from several other access points, indicating that there
are other wireless networks nearby and those nearby SSIDs define the context for Fav-Coffee
SSID. When the client observes the same wireless network with SSID Fav-Coffee at another
location, such as railway station or airport, the client should be suspicious of associating to
this access point as it might be an evil twin. The problem with this approach is that it does
not provide any form of authentication or any confidentiality mechanism to prevent injection
and eavesdropping which is the case in the following method EAP-SWAT.
• EAP-SWAT is a Secure Shell SSH-style authentication that performs one-way access point
authentication, which fits into the extensible authentication protocol (EAP) framework. EAP
is used to authenticate simple dialup and LAN connections. Its major scope is wireless net-
work communication such as access points used to authenticate client-wireless/LAN network
systems using a simple request and response mechanism [55]. EAP-SWAT provides one-way
authentication mechanism that does not require any key exchange; However, since this authen-
tication approach is based on the principle of trust-on-first-use, it could be vulnerable during
the first authentication.
We recommend any user not to use any unknown unsecured WiFi because as we saw in the
previous sections, it allows the data exchange without any form of encryption or security protection.
5.3.2 Man in the Middle Mitigation
To deter Man in the Middle attacks, data encryption must be used to ensure that intercepted traffic
is difficult to decipher by the attacker.
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5.4 Summary of Attacks and Mitigation
In this section, we summarizes the attacks and mitigation solutions and recommendations. In table
5.1,we show the recommendations for mitigation and protection on the two attacks we performed.





3. No connection to unsecured network
Man in the Middle Encrypt the traffic
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, we conclude our work and discuss future research directions that could be built on
our current work.
6.1 Conclusion
In chapter 2 we provided related research, background information and research work to support
different components of our thesis as well as highlighting the overall history of keys used for vehicles.
This study helped us to understand how the current Remote keyless system works and how it was
evolved. In Chapter 3, we showed the analysis and design of the Remote Car keyless Applications
on smartphones. We discussed several existing applications in the market and made a comparison
between the features. We described the architecture diagram of our simulation. In Chapter 4, we
showed the sequence diagram of the iOS application we built for the simulation and its communi-
cation with the backend server. In Chapter 5, we showed types of attacks performed on our system
(Evil Twin Attack and Man in the Middle attack). Finally, we analyzed some of these cyber-attack
vectors and provided mitigation techniques.
In Chapter 5, we concluded how to protect the user from cyber attacks that may happen while
using the Remote Keyless Application. The applications development engineers should design these
applications to communicate through secure channels such as SSL, TLS, and HTTPS. These secure
techniques can mitigate the Man in the Middle attacks. There are many applications in the app
store that are not using secure communication and are vulnerable to cyber attacks. The user must
avoid connecting to any unsecured WiFi connection, to avoid the Evil Twin Attack. There should
be a warning in the welcome screen advising the user to avoid using this application on an unsecured
WiFi connection and advise the user to use the cellular network instead.
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6.2 Future Work
In this section, we describe future research directions to extend our work with more studies about
the cyber attacks that could affect the Remote Car Keyless applications. We summarize future work
in the following points:
• Instead of deceiving the victims with the malicious WiFi connection (Evil Twin Attack),
capture the cellular network directly using RTL-SDR. Using this tool attacker can sniff the
unencrypted data.
• Capture the bluetooth signals from a remote cell phone and transmit it to the vehicle via
gadgets and study the possibility of deceiving the vehicle.
• Use HTTPs in the communication between the application and the backend server and study
the decryption of traffic using the Wireshark.
• Study different cyber attacks on vehicles after compromising the communication between the
application and the vehicle. Attacks such as (Timing Attack, Tunneling attack, Masquerade
attack and Replay attack) and show how these attacks could affect the ITS.
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